Competition in the Telephone Industry: What Will Congress Permit;Note by Curran, M. Kathleen
Journal of Legislation
Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 12
1-1-1977
Competition in the Telephone Industry: What Will
Congress Permit;Note
M. Kathleen Curran
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Curran, M. Kathleen (1977) "Competition in the Telephone Industry: What Will Congress Permit;Note," Journal of Legislation: Vol. 4:
Iss. 1, Article 12.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol4/iss1/12
COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY:
WHAT WILL CONGRESS PERMIT?
M. Kathleen Curran *
INTRODUCTION
The Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 201), which established the
Federal Communications Commission and brought all common carriers of tele-
communications under governmental regulation, may be completely revamped by
Congress in the near future.1 Rep. Lionel Van Deerlin, chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, has organized a staff to study the 43-
year-old statute, in response to an acrimonious battle between the telephone in-
dustry, led by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Inc., and bus-
inesses offering new types of communications equipment and services. The dis-
pute concerns the degree of competition that should be permitted in the com-
munications industry.
Nine years ago, the FCC authorized limited competition against the
telephone industry's services in two specialized markets: terminal equipment and
specialized common carriers. The Commission claimed that it had been inun-
dated with complaints from customers that the established communications com-
panies could not or would not provide them with new communications services
and equipment made possible due to advances in electronic and computer tech-
nology. 2
The telephone industry argued that the FCC had overstepped its statutory
jurisdiction and was formulating policy rather than regulating. Following lengthy
litigation in which the courts sustained the Commission's actions, the telephone
industry turned to Congress for relief. In March, 1976, 3 and again in January,
1977,4 the industry had a bill introduced which would drastically curtail com-
petition in the lucrative new markets.
THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS:
SPECIALIZED COMMON CARRIERS AND TERMINAL EQUIPMENT
When the Communications Act was passed in 1934, telecommunications
consisted primarily of two markets: voice telephone service provided by AT&T
*B.A., San Francisco State University, 1975; J. D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 1978.
1. Business Week, January 10, 1977, at 25-26.
2. Hearings on H.R. 12323 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications of the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
3. H.R. 12323, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 3192, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
4. H.R. 8, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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and the independent telephone companies, and telegraph service, provided by
Western Union. This structure continued undisturbed until the 1960's when
technological advances made it possible for computers and other sophisticated
equipment to be interconnected with the telephone network.5 When the old
rotary dial phone was replaced by the push-button telephone, it was found that
the distinctive tone patterns of the push-button equipment could be used to code
and decode instructions to computers.
6
This simple invention may change the lifestyle of every American. Ordi-
nary customers may soon be able to utilize their telephones to do their shopping
and banking electronically. The push button tones can instruct the computer to
transfer money from one account to another or to pay monthly bills. The
customer need only dial the access code to the computer and enter his user
number. A mini-computer attached to the customer's own home telephone can
be set so that a telephone call could turn utilities on or off. Or the computer
terminal could automatically switch an incoming call to another telephone
where the customer may then be located.7
The business world can make the most immediate use of these new
techniques in data transmission. Already, for example, police departments "call"
their computer in a distant city with a license plate number and receive infor-
mation about that number in a matter of seconds. A new type of company, the
specialized common carrier, wants to offer to businesses data transmission of
non-voice communications, utilizing microwaves or laser beams that operate at
a much higher frequency than telephone wires. In the past decade, the FCC
authorized these companies to interconnect with the telephone network per-
mitting customers to use ordinary telephones to key into the services offered by
the specialized common carriers. While some data transmission, such as teletype,
has existed in the past, it was a cumbersome and expensive process. Intercon-
nection with the national telephone network permits the specialized common
carrier to offer to a customer transmission of his data to any other customer who
also owns a telephone. Businessmen eagerly await the day when computers in
different parts of the country can "talk" to each other and produce information
at lightning speeds.
These specialized, or private line, offerings will not compete directly with
the basic voice telephone service of the telephone industry. Rather, the special-
ized common carriers claim that the new technology will expand the total com-
munications market by providing large industrial and governmental customers
with high speed transmission of data utilizing microwaves or satellites.
A related but separate new market ripe for competition is the "terminal
equipment" market. Terminal equipment is any piece of equipment directly
interconnected at the customer's end with the telephone network. Terminal
equipment includes the plain black telephone, the private branch exchange
(PBX), answering machines, facsimile devices and the multiple buttoned key
telephone. Prior to FCC decisions permitting competition in this area, the cus-
tomer's right to use privately manufactured (i.e., not produced by the Bell Sys-
5. Hearings, supra note 2, at 3-4.
6. Science Digest, November, 1976, at 48.
7. Science Digest, November, 1976, at 46-47.
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tem) equipment was severely limited. At present, however, there is a range of
equipment available to consumers. These options will be drastically curtailed if
Congress approves the industry-sponsored "Bell bill" discussed below.
THE CONSUMER COMMUNICATIONS REFORM ACT
In March, 1976, Rep. Teno Roncalio and Sen. Vance Hartke introduced
a bill on behalf of the telephone industry, entitled the Consumer Communications
Reform Act of 1976.8 This act would, if enacted, make the following significant
changes:
1) Divest the FCC of its jurisdiction over these new markets and vest
control completely in the regulatory commissions of the individual states;
2) Require specialized common carriers to prove that their services will
not result in a duplication of the present telephone industry's offerings or result
in any harm to the technical integrity of the telephone network;
3) Permit the established telephone companies to acquire any other
common carrier without regard to the proscriptions of the anti-trust laws;
4) Stipulate to the FCC what constitutes "just and reasonable" pricing
on the part of the telephone industry.
In September, 1976, the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications
held hearings on this bill. AT&T testified9 that the increasing competition will
cause higher telephone rates for the basic services as a result of wasteful dup-
lication of services and the "cream-skimming" of profits by competitors from
the specialized markets. The Bell system claims it uses the profits from these
markets to subsidize basic telephone service. AT&T has issued public statements
that the basic telephone rate may rise as much as 70% if competition is permit-
ted in these areas. 10 The telephone industry also asserts that this new com-
petition will pose a threat to the technical integrity of the telephone network
and cause a disruption of the efficient and integrated telephone system which
now services 95% of all American homes.
The opponents of the bill include consumer advocate Ralph Nader, AT&T
competitor Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) (whose survival depends on
the defeat or amendment of the bill), the FCC, and the New York State Public
Commission (which disputes the allegation that competition will cause the basic
rate to rise). The opponents claim that the telephone industry is trying to pro-
tect itself against healthy competition, obtain legislative approval of its "pre-
datory" pricing tactics, limit the telecommunications options open to consumers,
and raise the basic service rate.
The 94th Congress took no further action on this bill after the hearings
were completed. Consequently, the bill expired when Congress adjourned. How-
ever, on January 4, 1977, substantially the same bill (HR 8) was introduced into
the 95th Congress by Representative Roncalio. In February, 1977, a House resolu-
tion was passed to study the entire area of telecommunications. 11
8. H.R. 12323, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 3192, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
9. Hearings, supra note 2, at 2, 26 (testimony of AT&T Chairman deButts).
10. Business Week, November 18, 1976, at 116.
11. H.R. Res. 136, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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Since the entire statutory basis for telecommunication regulation is now
being reviewed by Congress, this note will summarize the background of the
subject before reviewing the evidence presented to the House Subcommittee in
September. The note will discuss how the traditional theory of the public utility
as a natural monopoly has been applied to the telephone industry, the specific
FCC actions taken since the 1960's which created the new competition in com-
munications, the appellate courts' reviews of the FCC actions, and the specific
issues discussed before the subcommittee in September, 1976.
NATURAL MONOPOLY AND THE TELEPHONE SYSTEM
Like public utilities, the telephone system in the United States has been
granted the status of a "natural monopoly. " 12 The classic definition of a natural
monopoly is given by Professors Kaysen and Turner: "In the economic sense, a
natural monopoly is a monopoly resulting from economies of scale such that one
firm of efficient size can produce all or more than the market can take at a re-
munerative price, and can continually expand its capacity at less cost than that of
a new firm entering the business." 13
The textbook example of a natural monopoly market is a small town
which can only feasibly support one daily newspaper. 14 The newspaper which
has the "monopoly" in this market should be exempt from antitrust laws, be-
cause it is felt that the economic reality of this limited market dictates that
only one firm can efficiently supply the consumers and still maintain a rate pro-
fitable enough for its economic survival.
In 1975, AT&T submitted to the FCC a rather dreary academic thesis,
"Natural Monopoly and the Bell System,' which traced economic theory from
the Nineteenth Century to the present to prove that the Bell system fits the "neo-
classical economic model of a natural monopoly." 15 However, care must be
taken to distinguish the use of the term "natural monopoly" in the economic
sense from the way that it is employed in the legal sense. The very term "natural
monopoly" may be a loaded one, conjuring visions of some victorious Darwinian
entity which has justifiably triumphed over its inefficient rivals.
Although the courts have consistently justified the structure of public
utilities as "natural monopolies," 16 it would be more precise to say that they are
statutory monopolies. Another example of a statutory monopoly is a patent. A
patent confers a monopoly power upon its owner for a limited time. The govern-
ment has decided to depart from a general policy favoring competition in order to
promote new inventions and reward the inventor. Likewise, the government has
made a policy decision that the services performed by public utilities are so
12. The power of the government to regulate common carriers or "businesses affected with the
public interest" was first prescribed by the Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). This
power included the setting of minimum rates. Id., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974);
Fcc v. RCA, 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
13. C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Twenty.Five Years of Antitrust Policy 191 (1954); Northern
Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 399 F. 2d 953, 965 (1968).
14. M. Handler, 7)ade Regulation, Cases and Materials 819 (1975).
15. F.C.C. Docket No. 2003, Bell Exhibit No. 27 (I. Horowitz, Natural Monopoly and the Bell
System).
16. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison,
419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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vital that they are best performed by one firm, supervised by a government
regulatory agency. The offerings of the utilities are considered to be "quasi-
public." Regulation by the government a ency takes the place of competition in
securing reasonable rates for consumers.
The practical problems which would result from competition were felt
to outweigh any benefits of competition in this area. As one writer has pointed
out:
The telephone is best treated as a monopoly because of the necessity of
unified service... If there are two telephone systems in a community, the
subscribers of one system will be unable to converse with the subscriber of
the other, and as a result the usefulness of the telephone system will be
greatly curtailed. 18
In return for protection from competitive rigors, utilities are required
by their regulatory agencies to perform a quasi-public function. One student of
public utilities describes this function in the following terms:
A public utility is under an extraordinary duty to render reasonably
adequate service to all who apply... A public utility is required to serve
up to the limit of its capacity, where capacity is more and more being
defined, not as mere physical capacity but as the limit of profitableness...
Finally, a public utility must observe more than ordinary care in the rendi-
tion of service... 19
In addition to the need to insure full and adequate public service, public
utilities are granted natural monopoly status because it is thought that "com-
petition is ruinous, that is, fails to establish a normal level of rates sufficiently
remunerative to attract the additional investments of capital that recurrently
become necessary." 20
The economic theory behind this statement is that, since the expenses of
utilities are generally fixed, the more customers served by the company, the lower
its costs per customer. Under a regulated system the lower costs may be passed on
to customers while allowing for sufficient capital to be retained by the company
to insure reliable equipment and service. Under a competitive system, it is assumed
that rates will be cut so low that poor service will result. For example, if expenses
are fixed, a telephone company in a competitive system could maximize profits
by providing service to new urban customers where the company had already
made the capital investment to string telephone wire. However, a competitive
system would discourage companies from making the capital investment to serve
a small number of rural users.2 1 Under a regulated system, all consumers are
17. A Farris & R. Sampson, Public Utilities, Regulation, Management and Ownership 157-58
(1973).
18. E. Jones & T. Bigham, Principles of Public Utilities 89 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Jones
& Bigham].
19. M. Glaseser, Public Utilities in American Capitalism 218 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Glaseser].
20. Jones & Bigham, supra note 18, at 70.
21. Jones & Bigham, supra note 18, at 72.
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assured of being served.
Four years after its establishment in 1937, the FCC itself conducted a
study of possible competition in the telephone industry and concluded: "Attempts
at this late date to develop a strong, independent telephone system would be
futile. . .[Protection of that interest (that of the rate-paying public) must be
accomplished through effective regulation of the telephone industry." 
22
Given this tradition of government protected monopoly in the utility
field, what prompted the FCC to permit competition in the communications
markets? The original impetus in favor of some limited competition came from
the courts rather than the Commission.
In 1953, the Supreme Court held, in Federal Communications Commis-
sion v. RCA Comm., Inc., 23 that the FCC had no authority under the 1934 Act
to sanction new radio-telegraph carriers (such as RCA). The Court specifically
held that the "national policy in favor of competition" upon which the Com-
mission had predicated its decision, was not in itself enough to override the basic
statutory scheme of natural monopoly. 24
However, the Court presented an important exception to its holding:
"Of course, the fact that there is substantial regulation does not preclude the
regulatory agency from drawing on competition for complementary or auxiliary
support."' 25 The Court went on to delineate those conditions under which the
Commission would be authorized to grant competition in complementary areas.
It required the Commission to find that competition was "reasonably feasible" 
26
and 'would serve some beneficial purpose, such as maintaining good service or
improving it. 127 These two requirements later became known as the "RCA
test" under which the Commission measured the present competitive offerings in
the specialized communications markets.
However, the "RCA test" was merely dicta and the Commission did not
at that time appreciate the latitude the high Court had given to the Commission.
It was an appellate court that first interjected limited competition into the
communications market.
FCC DECISIONS: TERMINAL EQUIPMENT MARKET
In the mid-1 950's, Hush-a-Phone Corporation developed a cup-like device
which, when attached to the telephone receiver, assured the speaker greater pri-
vacy and better reception by funneling his voice through the cup and into the
receiver. Pursuant to section 203(a) of the Communications Act, .the telephone
companies filed tariffs with the FCC forbidding the attachment of this device.
The FCC found that although the Hush-a-Phone was not "physically harmful",
it "impaired telephone service" within the broad meaning of the 1934 Act. 28
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dis-
agreed, stating that there were "no findings to support this conclusion of sys-
22. Glaseser, supra note 19, at 110.
23. 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
24. 346 U.S. 86, 92 (1953).
25. 346 U.S. 86, 93 (1953).
26. 346 U.S. 86, 96 (1953).
27. 346 U.S. 86, 97 (1953).
28. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F. 2d 266, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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tematic or public injury. "29 The court held the FCC action to be "unwarranted
interference with the telephone subscriber's right to reasonably use his telephone
in ways which are privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental."
30
The FCC relied upon Hush-a-Phone in 1968 when it approved the inter-
connection of the "carterphone" into the telephone network.3 ' The carterphone
is a device which connects the telephone network with mobile radio units. The
FCC found that "the principle of Hush-a-Phone is directly applicable here, there
being no material distinction between a foreign attachment such as the hush-a-
phone and an interconnect device such as the carterphone. ' 32  Within this de-
cision the FCC made the significant statement that a tariff- preventing any inter-
connect device merely because it was not supplied by AT&T was "discrimina-
tory" and "unlawful." ' 33
Prior to the Carterphone decision, virtually all terminal equipment, in-
cluding PBXs, answering devices and key telephones, were provided only by the
Bell system. The Carterphone decision enabled an industry providing special ter-
minal equipment to blossom almost overnight. The products ranged from sophis-
ticated computerized equipment to faddish antique telephones. More than 400
companies have entered the market since 1968. 34
However, at that time, the FCC did permit the telephone companies to
require customers to utilize AT&T-supplied protective connecting devices be-
tween their terminal equipment and the network. AT&T dispensed with this
requirement for certain types of "safe" equipment such as answering devices
which met company prescribed standards. 36
In 1975, the last vestige of AT&T control over the private terminal
equipment market was removed when the FCC ruled that equipment certified by
the Commission as having its own protective circuitry could be interconnected
directly into the telephone network without a connecting device. In making this
decision the FCC adopted the resolution of a joint board of federal and state
utility regulators. 3 ' The decision was prompted, in addition, by findings that
1) the Bell system did not use these connect devices for its own equipment;
2) Bell had allowed major customers, such as the U.S. military, to interconnect
directly into the network without the use of protective devices; 3) the devices
which customers were required to lease from Bell were often purchased by the
telephone company from independent manufacturers. Thus, if a customer needed
a protective interconnect device, the Commission reasoned, there was no reason
why he could not purchase it himself directly from the manufacturer. 38 The
Commission suspected that Bell wished to retain the income from the leasing of
the protective devices as much as it wanted to protect the telephone network
when it argued for the retention of control over this area.
29. 238 F. 2d 266, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
30. 238 F. 2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
31. Caterphone, 13 F.C.C. 2d 420 (1968), recon.denied, 14 F.C.C. 2d 571 (1968).
32. 13 F.C.C. 2d 420, 423-24 (1968).
33. 13 F.C.C. 2d 420, 424 (1968).
34. The New York 7Tmes Magazine, November 28, 1976, at 116.
35. Hearings, supra note 2, at 6-7.
36. Hearings, supra note 2, at 7.
37. Hearings, supra note 2, at 7.
38. Hearings, supra note 2, at 7.
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As a result of these decisions, a customer may now purchase any piece
of privately manufactured terminal equipment on the market and interconnect
it directly into the telephone network so long as the FCC certifies the equipment
as being safe. The FCC claims that the new competition in this area has spurred
innovations in equipment by both the new companies and the established carriers.
FCC DECISIONS - SPECIALIZED COMMON CARRIERS
Throughout the period when competition in terminal equipment was
expanding, the specialized common carriers recurrently petitioned the Com-
mission for authorization to provide specialized data transmission services tailored
to the needs of particular clients, such as the computer industry, government
and educational institutions. The staff of the FCC undertook a study of this
market and, in 1971, reported to the Commission as follows:
Data communications, which has been in an embryonic state of develop-
ment, will probably exhibit very substantial growth over the next decade.
In proposing a policy favoring the entry of new specialized common
carriers, we look towards a degree of competition oriented towards the de-
velopment of new communications services and markets and the appli-
cation of improvements in technology to changing and diverse demands. 39
The staff further concluded:
There is a substantial public need for the proposed services which is not
being met by the established carriers ... [There is] dissatisfaction on the
part of the computer industry and by many data users who have been
trying to adapt their requirements to existing services. 40
The Commission first authorized competition in this area 41 in 1969
when it permitted Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) to provide high speed
data transmission utilizing microwaves between Chicago and St. Louis. The
Commission justified this action under the RCA test that competition was reason-
ably feasible and could be expected to provide some public benefit. The public
benefit was the expansion of communications systems available to users to in-
clude microwaves, which can transmit data at a much faster speed than conven-
tional telephone wire. (Telephone wire must convert to lower frequencies when
channeled through the central office.)
After surveying the staff analysis of 1971, the Commission greatly ex-
panded this authorization in the Specialized Common Carrier42 decision. This
decision granted the requests of MCI and Datran (Data Transmission Corpor-
ation) to construct additional microwave facilities. In 1973, the Commission
authorized the use of domestic satellites as another method of high speed data
39. Specialized Common Carrier, 29 F.C.C. 2d 870, 881 (1971),afrd, 513 F. 2d 1142 (9th Cir.
1975).
40. 29 F.C.C. 2d 870, 882 (1971).
41. MCI, 18 F.C.C. 2d 953 (1969), recon. denied, 21 F.C.C. 2d 190 (1970).
42. 29 F.C.C 2d 870 (1971).
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transmission. 43
In permitting these new carriers to enter the communications markets,
the Commission made it clear that its intent was to expand the total communi-
cations system, rather than to siphon business from the existing common carriers.
The Commission further noted that the percentage of AT&T's business vulnerable
to this new competition was a miniscule two to four percent. 44 But the Com-
mission also declared in these decisions that it would sanction no protective re-
gulatory umbrella to bolster the economic viability of these new entrants. If com-
petition was to exist in the telecommunications field it would be real competi-
tion, governed by the free play of market forces. AT&T countered that the Com-
mission has not permitted the established companies to flex their full economic
muscle in these markets.
COURT DECISIONS
After seeing competition expand with each successive FCC decision, the
telephone industry turned to the appellate courts for relief. In 1974, the Com-
mission required the Bell system to allow MCI to interconnect into its local
exchange facilities. Bell argued that with this decision, the FCC had overstepped
its legislative authorization to regulate interstate communications. In Bell Tele-
phone Company of Pennsylvania v. FCC, 4 the Third Circuit sustained the FCC
policy of permitting competition in these areas as meeting the RCA test: "We re-
gard the listing of factors independent of competition and the identification of
benefits (reasonably expected) as proof that the FCC viewed competition as a
means rather than a goal in and of itself." 46
In 1975, the.Ninth Circuit 47 directly confronted the scope of the FCC's
authority. This case was brought by the Washington State Utilities Commission
and the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC),
which sought clarification of the jurisdiction over telecommunications services
originally interconnected into local exchanges. NARUC put forth the argument,
among others, that under the 1934 Act "new entrants (specialized common
carriers) would only be authorized when existing carriers could not provide
adequate services." 48 The court replied that:
NARUC interprets the statute too narrowly . .. the broad (statutory)
standard is to be interpreted in light of the Commission's sweeping
mandate to regulate 'interstate and foreign commerce so as to make avail-
able ...a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges.' 49
43. Domestic Satellite, 42 F.C.C. 2d 654 (1973).
44. 29 F.C.C. 2d 870, 882 (1971).
45. 503 F. 2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974).
46. 503 F. 2d 1250, 1272 (1974).
47. Washington Utilities and Transportation Comm. v. FCC, 513 F. 2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975).
48. 513 F. 2d 1142, 1157 (9th Cir. 1975).
49. 513 F. 2d 1142, 1157 (9th Cir. 1975).
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In 1976, NARUC and others claimed before the Fourth Circuit that the
FCC had again exceeded the authority given to it by the Communication Act,
this time regarding the authorization of customer-provided terminal equipment.50
The petitioners forcefully argued that section 2(b) (1) of the act specifically
forbade the Commission from intervention in the terminal equipment area when
it stated that this Act "shall not be construed to apply to or give the Commission
jurisdiction with respect to . . . facilities, or regulation for or in connection
with intrastate communication service ... of any carrier." 51 The court, however,
found that 1) "terminal equipment that is connected with the subscriber's station
and line does in fact connect with the national telephone network," '52  and
that 2) the legislative history of the Communications Act showed that section
2(b)(1) was directed at the narrow circumstance where a single telephone ex-
change serviced an area that included more than one state, such as where the
local exchange was close to the state border. 53
On the issue of legislative intent, the court further noted:
Congress cannot have been unaware that for some 30 years the FCC has
viewed and treated section 2(b) (1) of the Act as imposing no bar to its
exercise of jurisdiction over facilities used in connection with both intra-
state and interstate telephone communications. Significantly, it was as
recently as 1971 that Congress amended the Act by adding the present
section 410(c) with its discretionary Joint Federal-State Board pro-
cedure . . . We think it likely that Congress would have taken quite dif-
ferent action to restrict the Commission's jurisdiction and assure state
primacy if, in its view, the Commission has long and repeatedly been
exercising its jurisdiction and impinging upon an area whichCongress had
intended for exclusive state control.5 4
Thus, three circuits have sustained the FCC's primary jurisdiction over the
regulation of terminal equipment and specialized common carrier markets. On
December 14, 1976, the Supreme Court refused to review the Fourth Circuit's
decision. 5 Since the courts refuse to interpret the 1934 Act as vesting primary
jurisdiction in the states, the telephone industry made state primacy a major pro-
vision of its Consumer Communications Reform Act.
The Bell system still maintains that the FCC "has presumed not merely to
regulate but to legislate" 56 and the Consumer Communications Reform Act thus
"reaffirms" Congressional intent that jurisdiction over terminal and station equip-
ment shall rest with the states. However, the very existence of this proposed leg-
islation indicates that the telephone industry has abandoned its attempt to per-
suade the courts of its interpretation of the Communications Act. It is now for
Congress to decide, through this or other legislation, what degree of competition
50. North Carolina Util. Comm. v. FCC, 537 F. 2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
651 (1976).
51. 537 F. 2d 787, 791 (4th Cir. 1976).
52. 537 F. 2d 787, 791 (4th Cir. 1976).
53. 537 R. 2d 787, 795 (4th Cir. 1976).
54. 537 R. 2d 787, 795 (4th Cir. 1976).
55. 97 S. Ct. 651 (1976).
56. Hearings, supra note 2, at 3 (testimony of AT&T Chairman deButts).
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should be permitted in the telecommunications industry in the future, and how it
should be regulated.
THE BELL BILL
In September, 1976, the Subcommittee on Telecommunications of the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee held hearings on the tele-
phone industry sponsored bill. AT&T and the telephone industry presented cer-
tain arguments on their behalf, including: that the FCC has granted protective
umbrellas for new entrants into the market; that AT&T must obtain the FCC's
approval before marketing new products and thus suffers from a regulatory lag
that its competitors may not have to shoulder; and that the telephone industry
has a duty to provide universal service while competitors may concentrate on
selected lucrative markets without incurring the expenses of universal servicing.
AT&T says that these factors will prevent true competition from taking place.
Whatever the validity of these arguments, the proposed legislation, H.R. 12323,
will not adequately regulate the new trends in telecommunications in the best
interest of the public.
Rather, the ironically-titled Consumer Communications Reform Act
would probably do a great disservice to the consumer by chilling competition
and closing the options available to consumers in new telecommunications mar-
kets. The bill would also take the unprecedented action of stripping the FCC of
its jurisdiction over these markets and dictate to the Commission what con-
stitutes fair and reasonable prices for telephone services. Furthermore, the bill
would exempt telephone industry mergers from the antitrust laws.
THE EFFECT OF THE BELL BILL ON NEW MARKETS
New and existing specialized common carriers will be greatly hindered
by section 8(b) of this bill. It forbids the FCC from authorizing "any construc-
tion, acquisition, or operation of any communication line or facility ... to any
specialized carrier . . ." unless the carrier can prove 1) that this action will not
result in increased charges for telephone exchange services; 2) that the services
offered will not duplicate any service already offered by existing carriers; and
3) that the offerings will not significantly impair the technical integrity of the
nationwide telephone network. Particularly through the non-duplication require-
ment, this places an almost impossible burden on the specialized common carriers.
The FCC testified that "the proposed standards for authorizing any specialized
carrier applications are so unreasonable as to potentially eliminate existing and
preclude prospective carriers so that consumers would no longer enjoy any bene-
fits from such specialized networks." 57
Foreseeing the probable demise of the existing specialized carriers, sec-
tions 4 and 5 authorize the FCC to approve the acquisition of one common
carrier by an existing carrier. Section 4 goes further and exempts these acquisi-
tions from the antitrust laws: ". . . any Act or Acts of Congress making the pro-
57. Hearings, supra note 2, at 2.
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posed acquisitions unlawful shall not apply."
Competition from terminal equipment manufacturers is not attacked
directly in this bill. Even AT&T seems resigned to some competition from this
burgeoning industry. "We make no claim that the supply of terminal equipment is
by itself a natural monopoly." AT&T Chairman John D. deButts stated to the
subcommittee.5 8 However, Mr. deButts followed this admission with a reiter-
ation of the company's consistent argument that terminal equipment not supplied
and serviced by the telephone industry may constitute an impairment to the
technical integrity of the telephone network to which it is attached.
Section 2(b) of the bill warns ominously that "technical integrity . . .
(with) its co-ordinated planning, installation, improvement, management, opera-
tion and maintenance are indispensable elements in the interstate telecommuni-
cations network . . ." While this section does not forbid non-Bell terminal equip-
ment, it seems to be laying a foundation of legislative intent opposing privately
manufactured equipment which AT&T could use in future litigation against its
competitors.
Section 2(d) could cause further problems for the new terminal equip-
ment manufacturers. This section divests the FCC of its jurisdiction over ter-
minal equipment and vests it in the several states. Should this happen, the pri-
vate terminal equipment manufacturers will, at best, face a confusing patch-
work quilt of regulations varying from state to state. At worst, the state utility
commission may deny any interconnection of non-Bell equipment.
The Nader group, Public Citizen, strongly opposes this provision. Its
spokesman testified that the true impetus behind the measure is the greater
political influence that AT&T can exert upon state regulatory commissions than
upon the FCC. Public Citizen further contended that the state commissions,
which are responsible for "electric utilities, water companies, transportation
systems, pipelines, natural gas utilities and occasionally, interstate air carriers,"
in addition to the local telephone companies, are inadequately staffed to handle
the new terminal equipment market. To illustrate that effect, Public Citizen sub-
mitted a table contrasting the meager number of state public utility employees
in comparison to the size of the businesses which they must regulate.5 9
THE EFFECT OF THE BELL BILL ON TELEPHONE RATES
One of AT&T's most dramatic and well-publicized arguments is that the
profits made by the company from their long distance, specialized business
offerings and terminal equipment are utilized to hold down rates on the basic
telephone service. AT&T has issued statements claiming that basic rates could
rise as much as 70% if the new entrants are allowed to skim the profits from
the telephone industry.6 0 This claim is disputed by the FCC and by the New
York State Public Service Commission.
In 1972, the New York State Public Service Commission ordered New
York Telephone to unbundle its rates. "Unbundling" means a separate listing
58. Hearings, supra note 2, at 16 (testimony of AT&T Chairman deButts).
59. Hearings, supra note 2, at 10-11.
60. The New York Tmes Magazine, November 28, 1976, at 117.
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of costs and revenues attributable to each piece of equipment and type of service.
Unsatisfied with the data reported by the company, the Commission undertook
a three-year study of the company's records. The Commission declared that "this
comparison represented the first attempt in the country to check comprehen-
sively the validity of a telephone company's individual cost estimates." 61 The
results of this study were distinctly at odds with the telephone company's alle-
gations that terminal equipment revenues help to subsidize basic service. To the
contrary, the staff's study showed that "terminal equipment revenues fell some
$329 million short of meeting 1974-5 costs!"' 62 From this data the conclusion
must be drawn that, contrary to the company's assertions, basic service revenues
must be subsidizing the special terminal equipment offerings normally used by
big business customers, with the average consumer footing the bill.
New York Telephone disputed the results of the study, saying it was based
on incorrect methodology. "[The Company] . .. does not acknowledge, in any
manner, the validity as either a ratemaking tool or cost analysis tool, of the type
of study performed by the [Commissions's] staff," the company stated in a
memorandum. 63
The main point of contention between New York Telephone and the
Public Service Commission (as it is between AT&T and the FCC) is whether
terminal equipment costs should be evaluated on the basis of incremental costs
or fully distributed costs. The telephone companies' method of incremental
costing lists as costs only the expenses incurred in providing the specific piece
of terminal equipment; the utility commissions feel that true costs must also
reflect a percentage of overhead and investment expenditures. Specifically,
New York's P.S.C. staff wants the telephone company to include overhead and
the expense of the company's own terminal equipment as costs. The staff re-
marked: "It is hard to imagine ... that the company does not incur any ongoing
expenses to manage this billion dollar terminal equipment business in the midst
of stiff competition." ,64
Other studies by state utility commissions in Vermont and Massachusetts
tend to confirm the finding that terminal equipment is actually priced below
cost and thus can hardly be subsidizing the basic telephone service. In fact,
just the opposite situation appears to be the case.
How does the Consumer Communication Reform Act address the subject
of ratemaking? Section 3 of the bill decrees that "no compensatory charges for
or in connection with such communications services may be found to be unjust or
unreasonable on the grounds that it is [sic] is too low." "Compensatory" is de-
fined in the bill as a charge that "equals or exceeds the incremental cost of pro-
viding the communication service." This provision would definitely resolve the
dispute about ratemaking in favor of the telephone companies' methold of cost
accounting. This provision is bolstered by section 2(e) of the Act which admon-
61. New York State Public Service Commission, Staff Report 61 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
StaffReportJ.
62. New York State Public Service Commission, Press Release, September 13, 1976 at 1.
63. New York Telephone Co. (May 28, 1976) (unpublished memorandum in connection with
the 1975 cost-embedded terminal equipment study).
64. Staff Report, supra note 61, at 29-30.
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ishes that "the Federal Communications Commission shall take no action incon-
sistent with the findings and declarations of this Act."
The effect of this section would be to allow the telephone companies to
employ their "monopoly profits," or "economies of scale," as the telephone
companies would have it, to hold down the price on selected segments of their
telephone offerings, including terminal equipment offerings. AT&T claims that
the beneficiary of such a system will be the ordinary consumer who will receive
lower rates on basic service. Competitors, and some of the utility commissions,
on the other hand, assert that this will give Bell the opportunity to employ
predatorily low prices for its terminal equipment offerings in order to drive
competitors out of the market. For example, New York State's Public Service
Commission staff found that customers who provided their own privately-purchased
PBX system were required to pay the same monthly charge to Bell as customers
who received Bell- provided PBX equipment and servicing. Obviously, this practice
discourages customers from patronizing private PBX manufacturers. The staff
termed this "clearly an anti-competitive practice." 65
Furthermore, Microwave Communications, Inc., alleged in its testimony
that Datran, the innovative manufacturer of the switched digital service for com-
puter communications, has been driven to bankruptcy by AT&T's "predatory"
practices. 66
Regardless of whether big business or the average consumer is benefited
by the use of subsidies from one type of telecommunication service to another,
the FCC and Public Citizen point out that economic subsidies of one societal
group over another is a governmental and not a corporate function. In fact, the
FCC claims that the motivation behind its recent decision has been as much to
prevent discrimination between different classes of users, in accordance with the
FCC's statutory mandate, as it has been to promote competition.67
CONCLUSION
The public interest would best be served by allowing competition to con-
tinue in the new telecommunications markets of terminal equipment and special-
ized common carriers. Furthermore, if competition is permitted, it must be
genuine.
Congress should not sanction the telephone industry's use of incremental
pricing to undercut the industry's new competitors. The Federal Communications
Commission should be allowed to continue as the regulator of the telephone
industry. Finally, the FCC's hands should not be tied by congressional stipu-
lations which would prevent the Commission from regulating both pricing and
mergers in the telephone industry. For these reasons the "Bell Bill," H.R. 8,
should not be approved.
However, Congress and the FCC must take care to balance the regulation
of the industry so that the telephone industry's obligation to provide quasi-
public service does not act as a bar to its own viable competition. Congress was
65. Staff Report, supra note 61, at 26.
66. Hearings, supra note 2, at 15.
67. Hearings, supra note 2, at 3 (testimony of FCC Chairman Wiley).
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wise when it chose to study the entire field of telecommunications instead of
merely accepting or rejecting the telephone industry-sponsored bill. That industry
is now entering a unique phase in its history-one in which both regulated and
non-regulated businesses will be competing in the same markets. Congress and the
FCC must be alert to potential inequities that could result from new regulation
of the competition.
In his testimony before the subcommittee, AT&T Chairman John D.
deButts alluded to AT&T's real fear. He noted that IBM, ITT and RCA are all
poised and eager to enter the specialized markets.68 A consumer-conscious Con-
gress should keep this warning in mind. After all, consumers would hardly be
benefited if Bell's monopoly in specialized markets were handed over to another
giant conglomerate.
68. Hearings, supra note 2, at 15 (testimony of AT&T Chairman deButts).
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